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This research aims to study the mechanisms through which the South Korean state influenced the 
new and renewable energy sector during the Lee Myung-bak and Moon Jae-in administrations. 
Furthermore, this study aims to analyze the different approaches that each administration favored 
towards new and renewable energy policy based on their ideological leanings, as well as identify 
the relevant actors and the mechanisms of compensation for each actor. This study finds that 
both administrations actively shaped the new and renewable energy sector through legislative 
developments and major energy initiatives, despite the Moon administration showing efforts for 



























Legacy of the Developmental State and Political Preferences: Development of the South 
Korean New and Renewable Energy Sector 
 New and renewable energy1 development and “green growth” has been a persisting goal 
of governments worldwide, including that of South Korea. Throughout the history of the South 
Korean state’s development – from the strong state-led development model during the mid-to-
late 20th century under the “developmental state”, to the more liberalized and globalized 
economy of today – the state has been arguably the most important driver of economic growth. 
While the role of the state and its influence on the market has been generally argued to have 
diminished over time, studies concerning new and renewable energy development have 
demonstrated a new, bigger role of the South Korean government concerning new and renewable 
energy development (Kim, 2019). The purpose of this study is to verify such an argument by 
analyzing the consistencies and differences in the mechanism of state involvement in the new 
and renewable energy sector during the Lee Myung-bak and Moon Jae-in administrations. 
Furthermore, this study aims to study the actors involved in the new and renewable energy sector 
as well as their distinct interests resulting from policy developments led by the state.  
In May 2017 President Moon Jae-in began his term as the 19th president of South Korea, 
succeeding the impeached President Park Geun-Hye. The election of President Moon signaled a 
concurrent liberal turn within the executive and legislative branches for the first time since the 
Roh Moo-hyun presidency (2003-2008), during which the Democratic Party’s predecessor Uri 
Party enjoyed having a president from the party as well as a short-lived legislative advantage. 
Moon, a close friend and a political ally of Roh, promised a clean break from the preceding nine 
years of rule by right-leaning presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye (Korean Culture 
 
1 Official term defined by the Act on The Promotion of The Development, Use and Diffusion of New and 
Renewable Energy (2005) 
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and Information Service, 2017). During his speech at the shutdown ceremony of nuclear plant 
KORI-1, Moon announced his plan to break away from the existing structure of the energy sector 
based on nuclear and fossil fuel-derived energy sources and increasing energy generation 
through new and renewable sources (Park, 2017). Such a plan was outlined through his election 
platform, the “New and Renewable Energy 3020 Plan” announced in 2018 which outlined the 
government’s plan to derive 20% of national energy production through new and renewable 
sources by the year 2030, and the “Green New Deal” announced in 2020.  
 New and renewable energy source development has been a rather constant trend 
throughout the recent administrations in South Korea, as it was considered a crucial factor in 
enabling sustainable economic growth (Dent, 2014; Yoshida and Mori, 2015; Kim and Thurbon, 
2015). Kim (2019) further argues that Korea and Taiwan viewed the development of smaller-
scale power systems powered by new and renewable sources as a driver of economic growth. 
However, as noted by Chung & Kim (2018), energy policies and energy source development in 
South Korea has been accomplished through a rather undemocratic, top-down process. For 
example, large-scale, government-led infrastructure projects such as the “Four-River Restoration 
Project” during the Lee Myung-bak administration and the Green New Deal under the Moon Jae-
in administration have made significant moves toward new and renewable energy. Such a 
characteristic of development naturally draws one’s attention to the legacy of the developmental 
state, which is often argued to have been the model under which the South Korean economy saw 
a dramatic growth along with the other NICs in East Asia (Doner, Ritchie, & Slater, 2005; Pirie, 
2005; Thurbon, 2016).  
 The degree of state intervention within the South Korean economy, and whether it 
persisted to the present day has been a contentious topic; while it is widely believed that the 
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South Korean developmental state was heavily involved in the development of industrial 
capacity under President Park Chung-Hee, scholars disagree upon the extent of intervention in 
the 21st century (Stubbs, 2009). Such disagreements rise from the economic and political 
environment of the 21st century, where the South Korean economy is highly liberalized, and the 
top-down approach is difficult under a democratic political system (Thurbon, 2016). Similarly, in 
the specific context of new and renewable energy development, some scholars argue that the 
modern South Korean state has taken a step back into a guiding role (Yeung, 2016; Wong, 
2011).  
 However, other studies directly concerned with the newly expanding sector of new and 
renewable energy development, arguments have been made that the South Korea government has 
been embracing a new idea of “developmental environmentalism” due to several factors 
including energy insecurity caused by rising competition as well as a developmental legacy 
under the context of East Asian economies (Kim, 2019; Kim & Thurbon, 2015). Such literature 
argues for a not only persisting but an increased role of the state in directing new and renewable 
energy development, with the state leveraging its authority for a developmental model 
incorporating powerful private sector actors. While such existing literature successfully lay out 
the framework through which the “green industrialization” progressed in South Korea, they are 
rather limited in the sense that most analyses are limited to the time period of President Lee 
Myung-bak and his Green Growth initiative. Such limitation, along with the failure to 
acknowledge Lee’s background as a CEO of a major family-owned business conglomerate 
chaebol firm Hyundai’s engineering and construction subsidiary, which may have shaped his 
policy agenda, brings the need to incorporate other administrations of different political leanings 
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and presidential background for a better understanding of the South Korean new and renewable 
energy policies.  
 Thus, this research aims to verify the contemporary claim that the South Korean state’s 
capacity to direct new and renewable energy development has persisted and increased; in order 
to do so, two administrations placed on the opposing political aisle – that of Presidents Lee 
Myung-bak and Moon Jae-in – will be analyzed. Through the analysis, this research will be able 
to verify whether the aforementioned embrace of environmental developmentalism exists across 
the political aisle, as well as discover any preferences that the respective administrations may 
have had based on their political leanings. Particular focus will be placed on the role of the 
private and public sector actors, such as the state, chaebol firms and smaller firms involved in the 
new and renewable energy sector. 
I hypothesize that based on the policy developments and the government initiatives of the 
Lee and Moon administrations, the South Korean state does take on a leading role in 
coordinating the new and renewable energy development between the public and private sectors. 
Furthermore, I argue that noticeable differences in terms of the central actors may be found 
between the two administrations, with the right-leaning Lee administration favoring a more 
liberal market approach to the new and renewable energy market compared to the left-leaning 
Moon administration.  
In the following sections, I hope to verify the aforementioned hypotheses regarding 
government involvement based on their ideological preferences through a qualitative analysis of 
bills and state-led initiatives concerning the renewable energy sector. Furthermore, this study 
aims to identify the actors involved in the new and renewable energy sector and their distinct 
interests based on the respective administration’s policy decisions. The research section will be 
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mainly divided into three parts; in section 4, I aim to provide a thorough overview of the South 
Korean energy sector and the traditional actors involved in the new and renewable energy 
industry, ranging from the state to relevant business players including the chaebol firms. Section 
5 and 6 will provide a more in-depth analysis of the involved actors during each presidents’ 
terms.  
Literature Review 
South Korea as a Developmental State  
Johnson (1982), based on his research on Japan, characterized the developmental state as 
a political entity equipped with the scope to take initiative in market intervention, with pilot 
organizations spearheading the industrial policy development. Doner, Ritchie, & Slater (2005), 
also placing an emphasis on the institutions, define developmental states as “organizational 
complexes in which expert and coherent bureaucratic agencies collaborate with organized private 
sectors to spur national economic transformation.” In sum, the aforementioned literatures 
emphasize the importance of strong institutions with the power and intent to intervene in the 
market as one of the main characteristics of a developmental state. 
Scholars also attribute the main characteristic of a developmental state to its intervention 
in market through policy choices, mainly regarding the financial sector and export promotion; 
Pirie (2005), for example, finds the Korean policies in the 1970s – which picked the national 
winners via control over capital – as a defining characteristic of the Korean developmental state. 
Doner, Ritchie, & Slater (2005) finds the combination of export promotion policies and 
industrial deepening as distinctive characteristics of the developmental states in South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Singapore, arguing that the emphasis on export promotion through certain policies 
was maintained in the developmental states. The South Korean developmental state flourished 
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under the rule of President Park Chung-hee, during which five-year economic development plans 
were implemented through industry targeting and export promotion policies (Thurbon, 2016).  
Despite a general consensus on the characteristics of a developmental state and its 
application in the South Korean context, the question of whether developmental states exist to 
this day, and whether South Korea can be classified as one, is a contentious topic. Favoring the 
idea of an existing developmental state in South Korea, Thurbon (2016) argues for a re-definition 
of the term itself. Citing the active role of policy finance institutions (PFIs) in South Korea, 
Thurbon claims that developmental mindset – a shared idea by the political elites considering 
finance as a tool of supporting the productive economy – allows for the existence of a 
developmental state in the 21st century. Thurbon further argues for the importance of walking 
away from the idea that developmental states pertain to the idea of static institutions; such a 
viewpoint is supported by North (1966, p. 3) as well, through his argument that institutions 
involve and thus influence the performance of economies.  
On the other hand, certain scholars have also argued in favor of the shift of the state into 
a more supportive or regulatory role. Pirie (2005) argues that the South Korean state no longer 
plays an interventionist role in the economy, and Jayasuriya (2005, p.384) suggests that South 
Korea should now be classified as a regulatory state rather than a developmental one. Regulatory 
state, as Jayasuriya defines, arranges the regulatory frameworks within the economic order rather 
than directly allocating social and material goods and resources. Yeung (2016) argues that while 
the state did play a central role in developing the industrial capacity and helped the leading 
national firms – chaebols – to reach their current positions, the firms themselves have been 
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involved in a “strategic coupling” with globally prominent firms more recently as their growth 
strategy.  
State-Business Relationship in the New and Renewable Energy Sector 
 Finnegan (2019) provides a useful framework describing the mechanisms through which 
distribution of cost is made between the state, the industry, and the electorate in terms of climate 
policy. Finnegan notes that the industry players are less likely to block policy change when the 
state is able to credibly commit to compensation for industry; such credibility is formed through 
long-standing relationships, which is historically evident in the South Korean case between the 
state and chaebols (York, 2014).  
Chung and Kim (2018, p. 137) notes that energy policy in South Korea is a “very 
political issue rather than a strictly scientific or economic one”, arguing that due to the path 
dependency of the developmental state, such energy policy development has been mainly an 
undemocratic process in South Korea. Kim and Thurbon (2015) introduces the concept of 
developmental environmentalism, arguing that the South Korean state views new and renewable 
energy development as an economic growth strategy and therefore seeks to continue the legacy 
of developmentalism in the field of “green growth”. Kim and Thurbon (2015) further note that 
the role of chaebols was crucial in developing industrial capacity in energy-intensive industries, 
however that a trend of the inclusion of new actors outside of the traditional chaebols can be 
found in the new and renewable energy related initiatives under Lee Myung-bak administration, 
namely through the introduction of the Renewable Portfolio Standard system.  
 Kim (2019), on the other hand, discusses the current role of chaebol firms in the 
development of “hybridized industrial ecosystems (HIEs)” as well as the network of SMEs 
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serving as the supply network for the chaebol firms. Kim describes HIEs as a model of public 
and private cooperation in the promotion and export of green energy systems, following the 
traditional model of state-guided development effort. Kim further argues that through the 
development of smart microgrids – a system of managing renewable power generation and 
demand through artificial intelligence – the South Korea state has taken a larger role in 
developing the green energy sector (p. 159).  
Hypothesis and Methodology 
 This study will focus on the role of the state on the formation of new and renewable 
energy development, as well as the distinct interests of, and mechanisms of compensation for, 
the actors involved in the new and renewable energy sector. Scholars note that South Korean 
presidents hold “emperor-like” power over the legislature through two mechanisms; the 
president’s power over political appointments, and the lack of employable tools for check and 
balance against executive orders (Moon, 2013; Park, 2016). In order to identify the framework 
under which the South Korean left and right-leaning administrations’ policymaking is carried 
out, this study will analyze the legislative developments made under each administration as well 
as large-scale new and renewable energy related initiatives. By doing so, I hope to provide a 
clearer picture of the new and renewable energy policies development in South Korea as well as 
identify the distinct interests and the compensations of relevant actors. 
The analysis will be organized based on presidencies; the selection of the two 
administrations – Lee Myung-bak and Moon Jae-in – were made based on their unique political 
context that enables analyses using two approaches mentioned in this section. As noted 
previously, the South Korean political system can be characterized as heavily influenced by the 
executive branch with weaker influence from the National Assembly in comparison to 
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comparable democratic political systems (Park, 2016). Therefore, Lee and Moon’s opposing 
party association – Lee in the right-leaning Hannara Party and Moon in the left-leaning 
Democratic Party – and the legislative support they enjoyed within the National Assembly 
through their respective parties’ support will help provide a clearer picture of the policymaking 
preferences by the two administrations.  
The analysis of each presidency will consist of two approaches; first, I will be analyzing 
the role of the executive branch in new and renewable agenda-setting and subsequent policy 
development. The executive branch can introduce new legislations to the National Assembly 
through two ways; first, the Ministry of Government Legislation, an independent agency of the 
executive branch under the Prime Minister’s supervision, may draft and introduce bills to the 
assembly as they see fit. These “government bills”, compared to the “member bills'' that the 
members of the National Assembly may introduce, are not only more common but also are more 
likely to be passed without significant modifications at the National Assembly (Moon, 2013). 
Furthermore, the number of executive orders has surpassed that of other legislations every year 
between 2008 and 2020, indicating that executive orders are often used as a means of pursuing 
the president’s policymaking agenda.2 Therefore, close observation of the executive branch will 
be beneficial in understanding the objectives of each president in new and renewable energy 
development.  
Secondly, mechanisms of compensation within the new and renewable energy 
policymaking will be studied. Entities with vested interest in the new and renewable energy 
sector will be identified, considering the implications of new and renewable energy policies and 
initiatives on the overall energy sector. Through an analysis of how industry players adapt to 
 
2 Based on numbers reported on Korea Ministry of Government Legislation website (www.moleg.go.kr) 
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government policies and the mechanism through which government policy compensates the 
“losers'', the study aims to provide a thorough overview of the South Korean new and renewable 
energy sector as well as identify the underlying implications of legislative developments.  
In order to evaluate the findings, I present the following two hypotheses: 
1) Ideological Preference Hypothesis 
 Based on the contemporary understanding of left and right leaning governments, right-
leaning governments are more likely to favor a liberal market economy and authoritarian 
economic development and vice versa. Therefore, I hypothesize that the right-leaning Lee 
Myung-bak administration favored a more liberal market-based approach to new and renewable 
energy development, while at the same time following the model of authoritarian 
environmentalism presented by Gilley (2012). Gilley argues that authoritarian environmentalism 
shows characteristics of concentrated power in a few executive branches, with limited public 
participation (p. 288). On the other hand, the left-leaning Moon administration will favor a 
democratic environmentalism approach, with a larger number of actors and more public 
participation (Gilley 2012, pp. 288-289). At the same time, I hypothesize that the Moon 
administration favored a more hands-on approach to the new and renewable energy market 
compared to the Lee administration.  
2) Path Dependency Hypothesis 
Wong (2014) finds that the South Korean party system is weakly institutionalized, with a 
significant body of electorate identifying as independent voters. I argue that such a weak party 
system may allow for a larger degree of freedom for the president to pursue their policy agenda 
with lesser pressure to strictly follow the party’s ideological preference, along with the fact that 
the presidency is single-term and the concern for reelection does not exist for the president. 
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Furthermore, Han (2015) finds that the four-river restoration project during the Lee 
administration showed characteristics of developmental legacy; therefore, instead of the 
presidents following their respective party’s ideological leanings, I hypothesize that the new and 
renewable energy development in South Korea showed a path dependency in accordance with 
the nation’s developmental past, described as developmental environmentalism (Kim and 
Thurbon 2015). Accordingly, I argue that the South Korean state showed a consistent trend of a 
strong policy making power concentrated at the executive branch and its intervention in the new 
and renewable energy market.  
Political Overview and the New and Renewable Energy Sector 
South Korean Presidents, Parties, and National Assemblies 
In this section, I aim to provide a general overview of the South Korea political system 
concerning the National Assembly, main parties in opposing ideological camps, and the 
presidents’ affiliation in such parties. Such an overview is crucial in understanding the political 
support structure of each of the presidents, as it will provide a better insight into the 
presidencies’ political environment and thus their ability to pursue their political agenda. The 
South Korean National Assembly follows a multiparty system; presidential elections are held 
every five years, while the National Assembly members are elected every four years. National 
Assembly members are elected through a mixed system, with the majority elected through a 
district-based election system and less than 20% of the members elected based on a PR system.3 
See Table 1 for a summary of the terms of the four recent presidents, including their party 
affiliation and the 1st party of the National Assembly.4  
 
3 The current number and compositions of the South Korean National Assembly can be found at: 
https://www.assembly.go.kr/ 
4 The 1st party refers to the party with the largest number of seats in the National Assembly, regardless of majority.  
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Table 1 
Presidential and National Assembly Terms 
President (term) President’s Party Affiliation 
during Presidential Term 
National Assembly 




Hannara Party  
(한나라당) 
(-02/2012) 
Saenuri Party b 
(새누리당) 
(02/2012-) 
United New Democratic Party 
(17th Assembly, 05/2004 - 05/2008) 
Hannara Party 
(18th Assembly, 05/2008 - 05/2012) 
Saenuri Party 






(03/2017 - present) 
Democratic Party 
(20th Assembly, 05/2016 - 05/2020) 
(21st Assembly, 05/2020 - present) 
 
a. Uri Party was merged into the United New Democratic Party in August 2007. 
b. Hannara Party re-branded to Saenuri Party in February 2012. 
  
Both presidents Lee Myung-bak and Moon Jae-in enjoyed a legislative advantage in the 
respective National Assembly. Furthermore, Table 2 summarizes the self-described ideological 
leanings of each party and the affiliated presidents.5  
Table 2  
Ideological Leanings of 1st Parties in Korea, 18th-21st Assembly 
Conservative Liberal 
Name Affiliated President(s) Name Affiliated President(s) 
Hannara Party Lee Myung-Bak Democratic Party Moon Jae-In 





5 Ideological camps of each party in table 4.2 are as self-described in the official party platforms.  
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Such alignment of the presidents’ and the National Assembly’s political leanings imply that an 
analysis of legislative development during such presidencies will allow for a clearer 
understanding of each political party’s, as well as the presidents’, preference in new and 
renewable development approaches.  
Overview of the South Korean New and Renewable Energy Sector 
 Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) is the sole converter and distributor of 
electricity in South Korea, including those derived from new and renewable sources. As of 2021, 
the majority of its share (51.1%) belong to the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the state-
owned Korea Development Bank, effectively ensuring government oversight over energy 
distribution. KEPCO managed the production of electricity as well until 2001, when the 
production sector of KEPCO was privatized into 6 different corporations (Act on the Promotion 
of Restructuring the Electric Power Industry, 2000). The act forbade any electricity producers 
from participating in more than one of the following aspects of electricity: production, 
conversion, and sale. However, the act stated the exemption for KEPCO from such requirements 
by stating that entities involved in both conversion and sale would be exempted from the act. The 
six corporations under KEPCO are comprised of five charged with regional energy production, 
and Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. Ltd (KHNP) in charge of nuclear and hydroelectric 
plants. As of March 2021, KEPCO manages the conversion and sale of electricity produced by 
its subsidiaries as well as from private, small-scale energy companies. See Figure 1 for a graphic 





Figure 1  
Structure of South Korean Energy Generation, Conversion and Distribution 
 
 
The term “alternative energy (대체에너지)” appears for the first time in the South 
Korean legislations in 1988 under President Chun Doo-hwan, as part of the “Act On The 
Promotion Of The Development of Alternative Energy”. The act defines “alternative energy” as 
coming from energy sources excluding oil, coal, nuclear, or natural gas; the list of such energy 
sources is given as: solar, bio, wind, small hydro, fuel cell, CTL (Coal to Liquid), gasified coal, 
marine, refuse-derived fuel, and others as directed by executive order of the president. The act 
sought to diversify the existing energy sources and utilize those as a driver of economic growth 
(Act on The Promotion of The Development of Alternative Energy, 1987). The act further 
allowed for the temporal ministry in charge to encourage such development through purpose-
specific R&D institutions – often subsidiaries of private firms – and higher education 
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institutions, as well as publicly owned government institutions. The act also encouraged the 
involvement of Industrial Technology Research Associations, which were cooperatives between 
R&D institutions dedicated to the advancement of industrial technology, as defined by the 
Industrial Technology Research Cooperatives Support Act of 1986.  
Development of the new and renewable energy sources were carried out by the Ministry 
of Energy and Resources, which was merged with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in 
1993 into the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Resources. The Ministry of Commerce, 
Industry and Resources was later reorganized into the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in 
1994 and was charged with such development until its dismantling in 1998. As noted by the 
revision of the act in 1998, the Ministry of Commerce Industry and Energy was newly given the 
authority to spearhead the development of renewable energy sources.  
Per the amendment of the Act on The Promotion of the Development, Use and Diffusion 
of Alternative Energy in 2002 under President Kim Dae-Jung, the definition of alternative energy 
was expanded to include geothermal energy as well as hydrogen fuel energy. Per the amendment, 
the Ministry of Commerce Industry and Energy was given the authority of authenticating and 
certifying any entity producing, importing, or selling facilities for new and renewable energy 
sources, further implementing a system of government oversight on the renewable energy sector 
(Act on The Promotion of the Development, Use and Diffusion of Alternative Energy, 2002). 
The 2002 amendment on the act was significant in a sense that it implemented a financial support 
system for entities producing electricity from renewable energy sources, through the FIT (Feed-
In Tariff) system reimbursing the producers of renewable-source derived electricity should the 
cost of production be higher than its market price set by the Ministry of Commerce Industry and 
Energy. The FIT system persisted into the Lee Myung-bak administration until it was replaced 
 19 
by the RPS system in 2012. The title of the Act on The Promotion of the Development, Use and 
Diffusion of Alternative Energy was changed to the Act on The Promotion of The Development, 
Use and Diffusion of New and Renewable Energy in 2005, replacing the term “alternative 
energy” with “new and renewable energy”.  
 In the business sector, many chaebol firms are largely involved in energy generation as 
well as power plant construction. See Table 3 for an overview of the South Korean major firms’ 
involvement in the new and renewable energy sector.  
Table 3 
Major Business Players and Energy Plants Construction 
Name Chaebol 
Affiliation 
Energy plant(s) constructed 
LS Electric LG Solar 
SK E&G SK Solar, wind, fuel cell 
Samsung C&T Samsung Coal, solar, nuclear 
POSCO - LNG, solar, wind 
GS Energy GS LNG 





Tidal, solar, wind, geothermal 
Daewoo E&C Daewoo Oil, LNG, nuclear 
Hanwha Energy Hanwha Solar (export oriented), LNG, coal 
 
 In South Korea, energy generation is heavily dependent on coal as a main source, 
followed by nuclear and LNG. While coal and nuclear are considered base-load energy sources, 
LNG is a peak-load energy source which operates primarily under energy shortage (Lee et al. 
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2019). See Table 4 for an overview of energy generation in South Korea by energy sources, from 
2008 to 2019 (latest data available). 6 
Table 4 









Energy Sources  
 
Total 









150,958 173,508 15,426 75,809 2,493 4,162 422,355 





147,771 193,216 19,911 65,273 2,828 4,604 433,604 





148,596 193,769 25,356 95,147 2,790 9,002 474,660 





154,723 200,124 24,921 101,702 3,233 12,190 496,893 





150,327 180,752 48,244 113,984 3,683 12,587 509,574 





138,784 200,444 31,584 127,724 4,105 14,506 517,148 





156,407 203,446 24,950 114,654 5,068 17,446 527,971 
 
6 Korea Energy Agency 
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161,995 213,803 14,001 121,018 3,787 25,837 540,441 





148,427 238,799 8,358 122,785 4,186 30,974 553,530 





133,505 238,967 5,740 152,787 3,911 35,736 570,647 





145,910 227,384 3,292 144,355 3,458 38,641 563,040 
Share 25.9 40.4 0.6 25.6 0.6 6.9 100 
 
Source: Electric Power Statistics Information System 
(http://epsis.kpx.or.kr/epsisnew/selectEkifBoardList.do?menuId=080402&boardId=040200) 
 
From the table above, it can be seen that new and renewable energy generation has seen a steady 
increase from 2008 to 2019. Nuclear energy generation saw a sharp decline in 2017 at the 
beginning of the Moon administration, however increased by 2.5% between 2018 and 2019. It is 
notable that LNG generation sharply increased by 4.6% as well during the same period, implying 
more frequent energy shortage. 
An overview of energy generation cost by energy sources will be helpful in understanding 
the government’s policy choices. See Table 5 and 6 below for the cost of energy generation by 
sources during the Lee and Moon administrations. 
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Table 5 
Energy Generation Cost by Source, Lee Administration (2008-2012) 
Year 
Cost of Generation 
Nuclear Black Coal Bituminous Coal Oil LNG 
KRW/kWh KRW/kWh KRW/kWh KRW/kWh KRW/kWh 
2012 4.02 48.74 74.64 247.95 140.97 
2011 3.66 45.75 70.92 202.10 121.20 
2010 3.39 39.50 68.95 163.88 107.80 
2009 3.21 44.55 70.15 138.94 112.72 
2008 3.10 32.27 73.62 156.29 121.92 




Energy Generation Cost by Source, Moon Administration (2017-2021) 
Year 
Cost of Generation 
Nuclear Black Coal Bituminous Coal Oil LNG 
KRW/kWh KRW/kWh KRW/kWh KRW/kWh KRW/kWh 
2021 6.13 46.80 63.55 154.16 76.35 
2020 6.04 50.62 60.46 175.53 71.83 
2019 5.94 56.42 66.17 181.98 93.38 
2018 5.84 54.34 64.81 164.57 97.87 
2017 5.73 47.62 61.23 139.70 85.85 
 
Source: Electric Power Statistics Information System 
(http://epsis.kpx.or.kr/epsisnew/selectEkifBoardList.do?menuId=080402&boardId=040200) 
 
  While the cost of energy generation was not included in the official data above, a KEPCO 
report in 2020 found that as of 2019, the generation cost for nuclear energy –including the cost of 
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waste management and plant construction – was less than 50% of the cost of solar energy 
generation. However, a 2020 report by the Korea Energy Economics Institute predicted that by 
2030, solar and hydro energy generation cost would be lower than the cost of energy generation 
by coal, oil, and LNG – providing a rationale for the South Korean government to increase their 
transition effort towards solar and hydro energy generation.  
Lee Myung-bak Administration (2008-2013) 
Political Background and Major Energy Initiatives 
 President Lee Myung-bak was elected as the 17th president of South Korea in 2008 as a 
candidate from the right-leaning Hannara Party. Hannara Party, which re-branded to Saenuri 
Party in 2012, held legislative advantage as the 1st party of the National Assembly from May 
2008 to the end of Lee’s term and onward. Despite having a legislative advantage, Lee found 
himself in a number of political crises throughout his term, including a nationwide protest 
against the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement in 2008 and the global financial crisis of 2007-
2008. 
Lee most notably served as the CEO of Hyundai Engineering and Construction – a 
subsidiary of chaebol firm Hyundai – for 24 years before entering politics through the 1992 
National Assembly election. Lee oversaw the construction of Gyeongbu Expressway, which was 
a major infrastructural project led by President Park Chung-hee in the late 1960s. As noted by 
scholars, Lee maintained a close relationship with the chaebol firms during his political career, 
and he was endorsed by Chung Mong-Joon – the CEO of Hyundai Heavy Industries – during the 
2008 presidential election (Oh, 2012). Lee served as the Mayor of Seoul from 2002 to 2006, 
during which he led infrastructure projects such as the restoration of Cheonggyecheon river.  
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 Prior to inauguration, Lee’s Presidential Transition Committee introduced amendments to 
the Government Organization Act, which created the Ministry of Knowledge Economy by 
reforming the preexisting Ministry of Commerce Industry and Energy. The Ministry of 
Knowledge Economy was charged with its predecessor’s role of overseeing industry, trade, and 
energy policies; additionally, the Ministry of Information and Commerce was shut down and the 
Ministry of Knowledge Economy took over their role of industrial R&D policy management. 
Such bureaucratic reform reflected Lee’s agenda of simplifying government agency 
organization, and ultimately, a smaller government (Government Organization Act, 2008).  
Lee and Lee (2015) argue that President Lee Myung-bak preferred a hands-on approach 
to national development in his policy agenda; the “Low-carbon Green Growth” strategy 
announced in 2009 involved a major infrastructural project which aimed to restore the four major 
rivers in South Korea. The four-river restoration project was allocated a budget of $30 billion, 
and was expected to restore the ecosystem of the rivers through increases in dam capacity, as 
well as generate hydroelectric energy with newly installed plants (Cheong Wa Dae, 2010). The 
project was seen as a stepping stone to his proposed major infrastructural project of constructing 
the “Grand Korean Waterway”, which aimed to construct a canal running through the Korean 
peninsula (Han, 2015). The project was carried out by a consortium of major domestic 
construction companies – many of which were chaebol firms – including subsidiaries of 
Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo, GS, SK, and POSCO. 
 President Lee created the Committee on Green Growth in 2009 immediately following 
his inauguration, merging three preexisting committees – committee on climate change response, 
committee on national energy, and committee on sustainable growth – into a singular committee 
directly under the Office of the President. The Office for Government Policy Coordination, an 
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agency under the Office of the Prime Minister, introduced the Framework Act on Low Carbon, 
Green Growth in 2010. The Framework Act sought to more effectively coordinate individual 
government agencies’ effort for climate change response and sustainable growth using new and 
renewable energy (Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth, 2010).  
Transition from Feed-in Tariff (FIT) to Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) 
President Lee announced in 2010 that he envisioned solar and wind power to serve as the 
new driver of economic growth, drawing parallels with the semiconductor and the shipbuilding 
industry which were crucial in the development of the South Korean economy (Committee on 
Green Growth, 2010). The 2010 amendment to the Act on the Promotion of the Development, 
Use and Diffusion of New and Renewable Energy was introduced by the National Assembly’s 
Committee on Knowledge Economy, introducing the RPS and REC weight system into the new 
and renewable energy sector.  
Such transition was outlined prior to the amendment, through the “3rd Basic Plan on New 
and Renewable Energy Development, Use and Diffusion” published by the Ministry of 
Knowledge Economy in 2008. Per the amendment passed in 2010, the RPS system was set to 
replace the FIT system starting in January 2012. “Guideline on the Maintenance and Execution 
of RPS'' was also announced in January 2012 as a government bill, defining RPS as a system of 
energy generation mandating large-scale energy generators (over 500MW generation capacity) to 
provide over a certain percentage of electricity through new and renewable energy sources. Per 
an executive order in 2010, the RPS value was initially set at 2% upon implementation, and the 
Office of RPS Management was formed under the Korea Energy Management Corporation 
(currently Korea Energy Agency) within the Ministry of Ministry of Knowledge Economy. The 
power generators meeting the criteria currently includes 23 firms as of 2021, including the six 
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power plants under KEPCO and two chaebol firms SK and GS (Korea Energy Agency, 2021). 
See Table 7 for the RPS percentage from the year 2012 to 2021.  
Table 7 
RPS Percentage from 2012 to 2021 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
RPS 
(%) 
2 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.5 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 9.0 
 
Source: Korea Energy Agency 
 
Alternatively, applying to those who did not meet such RPS requirements of energy 
production, a system of Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) weight was introduced. According 
to the REC system, firms not compliant with the RPS requirements were required to purchase the 
appropriate amount of REC from new and renewable energy generators. Different energy 
sources were assigned different REC weights as decided by the Minister of Knowledge Economy 
and therefore different prices of RECs, and such weight were to be determined based on the three 
following criteria: the energy source’s impact on industry promotion, cost of energy generation, 
national availability of the energy source, and finally its impact on reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions (Guideline on the Maintenance and Execution of RPS, 2012).  
With the introduction of the RPS system and the REC weight, the preexisting FIT system 
was abandoned. The FIT system had seen a decline since Lee’s inauguration; in the “2009 report 
on New and Renewable Energy-related Technology Development, Use and Diffusion”, the 
Ministry of Knowledge Economy stated that the continuation of the FIT system was 
inappropriate due to budgetary constraints and its limitation in promoting widespread usage of 
renewable energy sources. Government subsidization of new and renewable energy production 
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cost gradually decreased between 2008 and 2012; the shift away from the FIT system was met 
with criticism largely from the small-scale energy industry as well as environmental groups. 
Korea Federation for Environmental Movements (KFEM) – the largest federation of 
environmental NGOs in Korea – argued that the shift to the RPS system may deter private 
investment and therefore result in heavier dependence on fossil and nuclear energy (Lee, 2011). 
Furthermore, KHNP objected to being subjected to the RPS requirements on the basis that 
nuclear energy generation does not emit greenhouse gas, as well as that it would be financially 
unrealistic for KHNP to purchase RECs considering the large amount of energy generated by 
KHNP (Jang, 2009). In June 2010, The Ministry of Knowledge Economy agreed to reduce the 
RPS requirement for KHNP by 50% (Ju, 2010). 
A 2010 report by Kim and Cho on the economic impact of the RPS system predicted that 
the RPS system would result in increased new and renewable energy generation, as well as 
complement the limitations of FIT. Furthermore, the model predicted that RPS would be more 
beneficial for the long-term, post-implementation stage of new and renewable energy. A 2014 
report by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy found that the RPS system increased new 
and renewable energy generation by 170% within two years of implementation.   
Business Interest and Representation 
The switch from the FIT to RPS system signaled a transition in the mechanism of state 
involvement in the new and renewable energy sector. Unlike the previous method of 
subsidization and therefore incentivizing firms to enter the new and renewable energy market, 
RPS provided a regulatory enforcement of new and renewable energy usage. Small and medium 
sized new and renewable energy generators were provided with a new market for revenue, as 
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large-scale power plants without the capacity to meet the RPS requirements entered the REC 
market.  
On the other hand, chaebol firms such as Samsung, Hyundai, and Daewoo involved with 
the traditional power plant construction not only increased their involvement in providing parts 
(panels, turbines, etc.) for new and renewable power plants, but also increased overseas power 
plant construction, which was one of the main export initiatives by President Lee. Samsung 
Economic Research Institute carried out the 2008 report by the Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy, which led to the formation of the “3rd Basic Plan on New and Renewable Energy 
Development, Use and Diffusion”. The report argued for the need for a market-driven new and 
renewable energy development, which was emphasized again in the 3rd Basic Plan on New and 
Renewable Energy Development, Use and Diffusion.  
Moon Jae-in Administration (2017-2022) 
Political Background and Nuclear Energy 
President Moon Jae-in succeeded President Park Geun-Hye following months of protests 
against the administration which led to her impeachment. Upon inauguration, Moon promised an 
economy based on higher wages and a liberal market, as well as stricter anti-corruption measures 
towards chaebols (Democratic Party, 2017). A former leader of the Democratic Party, Moon 
enjoyed a legislative advantage in the Democratic Party-led 20th and 21st National Assembly, 
with the Democratic Party holding 110 out of 253 seats and 180 out of 300 seats in each 
assembly.  
 In discussing the new and renewable energy policies under President Moon, the phasing 
out of nuclear energy is noteworthy. The most notable proposal of President Moon during his 
campaign was the proposed break from nuclear energy; he promised no new construction of 
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nuclear energy plants, as well as the gradual discontinuation of existing nuclear energy plants 
(Park, 2017). Energy shortage from the proposed phasing out of nuclear energy plants – in 
addition to the reduced reliance on fossil fuels – would be filled with new and renewable energy, 
which he promised would account for 20% of the total energy production by the year 2030 
according to a plan announced in 2018. Furthermore, Moon announced that the energy sector 
would undergo a fundamental transition from a supply-based system – which he condemned to 
be a cause of drastic increase of energy demand – to a more cost-efficient, demand-based system 
(Park, 2017). Such an argument rationalized the phasing out of nuclear energy and the 
anticipated energy shortage without a significant cost incurring within the new and renewable 
energy sector.  
The phase-out plan of nuclear plants faced opposition from the public as well as the 
nuclear energy industry, with main arguments concerned with the cost efficiency of phasing out 
of nuclear energy plants which amounted to the production of over 30% of the total electricity 
produced in South Korea – opposed to a mere 5% from new and renewable sources – at the point 
of his inauguration in May 2017.7 Nevertheless, during his first year of term Moon proceeded by 
announcing the shutdown of KORI-1, the first nuclear energy plant built in South Korea. The 
construction of Shin-KORI 5 and 6 in July 2017 was put to a referendum, where a random 
sample of non-expert 500 citizens voted on the continuation of construction advised by 
academics and experts. Such a process, publicly announced and reported, can be interpreted as 
the administration’s effort to democratize the energy process. Immediately preceding the vote, 
Moon appointed Paik Un-gyu as the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy; Paik, a former 
technology advisor turned academic, was expected to spearhead the switch to new and renewable 
 
7 Source: Korea Energy Agency 
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energy due to his expertise in the energy sector. Paik argued for a more democratic process 
involving non-experts – citizens – in discussing issues related to the future of nuclear plants 
(Kim, 2017).  
Moon’s plan of cancelling the construction of two nuclear plants – Shin-KORI 5 and 6 – 
was cancelled according to the result of the referendum, while Lee Kwan-sup, the CEO of 
KHNP, publicly stated his opposition to a permanent shutdown of the two plants. Shortly 
thereafter, Lee stepped down from the position of president in January 2018 and was succeeded 
by Jeong Jae-hun who was appointed by President Moon.  
Energy 3020 and the Green New Deal 
The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) announced “New and Renewable 
Energy 3020 Implementation Plan” in December 2017, which outlined the government’s plan to 
derive 20% of total generated energy through new and renewable sources by 2030. The plan 
listed the government’s plan to: 
1) provide one out of 15 households and buildings with new and renewable energy 
generators. 
2) (for small-scale energy cooperatives) introduce a feed-in-tariff (FIT) system for 5 years 
and raise the REC weight. 
3) (for inferior farmland8 and reclaimed saline land) permit installation of solar energy 
generators. 
4) provide administrative support for regional new and renewable energy projects with 
better cooperation with residents. 
 
 
8 Farmland without basic agricultural infrastructure as defined by legislation 
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In July 2020, as part of the 3rd supplementary budget bill for economic stimulus in 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, a plan for a Korean Green New Deal was introduced by 
the MOTIE and the Ministry of Environment. Budget for the Green New Deal accounted for 
35% of the entire $140 billion (=160 trillion won) budget bill; included initiatives directly 
regarding new and renewable energy included:  
1) creation of “Green Smart Schools” through government investment and build-transfer-
lease system (BTL)9, providing over 2,890 primary and secondary education institutions 
nationwide with solar energy generators, etc.  
2) “Green Remodeling”: installing solar energy panels to over 225,000 government-owned 
rental housing residences, newly constructed public daycare and recreation centers, and 
1,148 cultural centers such as museums and libraries. 
3) $10 billion investment into new and renewable energy-related R&D and infrastructural 
projects.  
In addition to the initiatives directly related to new and renewable energy development, the 
Green New Deal also included initiatives on a more widespread usage of hydroelectric cars and 
formation of smart grids. 
Reintroduction of FIT and Business Interests 
As part of the New and Renewable Energy 3020 implementation plan, the FIT system 
was reintroduced for a limited period from 2018 to 2023. Through the adjusted FIT system, 
small to medium sized new and renewable energy producers were allowed to apply for the FIT in 
a form of 20-year contracts with the KEPCO subsidiary energy companies, with the price 
adjusted based on the REC weight set by the government. Such modified FIT system, used in 
 
9 System of government leasing privately constructed buildings 
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combination with the preexisting REC weight, provided a more secure market for smaller new 
and renewable energy producers otherwise hurt by the continuous decline in the REC weight. A 
report by Lee and Kang (2019) found that the REC price drop was due to increased market entry 
by small and medium sized energy generators, which in turn resulted in oversupply and drop in 
REC prices.  
In March 2021, an amendment to the Electric Utility Act led by Democratic Party 
member Kim Sung-whan was passed in the National Assembly. By amending the 2001 
amendment of the Electric Utility Act – allowing new and renewable energy producers to be 
involved in the sale and distribution of electricity – the bill would open the possibility of KEPCO 
to generate new and renewable energy. The bill was met with criticism from the private small 
scale energy producers especially in the new and renewable energy sector, as the amendment 
would partially reverse the 2001 bill privatizing the production of energy and create a 
disadvantage for such producers. The Citizen’s Energy Generation Cooperation Union, 
composed of 8,000 members in the small-scale new and renewable energy generation industry, 
publicly argued for the need for KEPCO to allow for more avenues of sale for small scale energy 
producers, rather than involvement in the power generation aspect (Yoon, 2021). The effort was 
met with concern by the Wind Power Industry Association as well, which argued that private, 
small-scale energy producers would be unable to compete with KEPCO in regard to economic 
efficiency (Yoon, 2021).  
Nonetheless, the act opened an avenue for small-scale new and renewable energy 
producers to directly sell the energy to buyers, referred to as the Power Purchase Agreement 
(PPA) system. Kim sung-whan, in his proposal for the amendment, argued that the PPA system 
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would be a step forward in allowing more firms to comply with the RE100 initiative by using 
100% new and renewable energy (Ministry of Government Legislation, 2021). 
The aforementioned legislative development, which can be seen as reflecting the 
government’s plan to increase direct involvement in the new and renewable energy market can 
be explained in two ways; first, stagnation in the progress in meeting climate change goals may 
have exacerbated the need for a more direct government involvement. A 2019 report by the 
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) noted that the decline of nuclear power 
generation during the Moon administration had resulted in increase of fossil fuel and LNG 
energy production, leading to an increased greenhouse gas emission. As a result, the 
administration has partially reversed its agenda on nuclear phase-out as of 2021, increasing 
energy production through nuclear plants by 9.6% in 2020 compared to 2019 (KEPCO, 2021).  
Second, allowing energy generation by KEPCO and introducing PPA could serve as a 
mechanism of compensation for the large businesses. With chaebol firms such as LG, SK, 
Samsung, and POSCO being involved in the production of new and renewable energy-related 
equipment, large scale installation of new and renewable energy generators by KEPCO are likely 
to be carried out by an overlapping pool of chaebol firms with sufficient resources and industrial 
capacity. 
Public Opinion and Democratization Efforts 
 A bill amending the Act on The Promotion of The Development, Use and Diffusion of 
New and Renewable Energy was introduced by the National Assembly’s Trade, Industry, Energy 
and SME Committee and passed in March 2020. The amendment granted the national and local 
governments the power to lend or sell off government-owned property via private contracts, 
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whenever seen as beneficial for projects concerned with the development, use, or diffusion of 
new and renewable energy.  
As shown through the citizen’s vote on Shin-KORI nuclear plant 5 and 6 construction, 
Moon showed a constant democratization effort in his new and renewable energy policy. Moon’s 
Green New Deal emphasized public participation in the diffusion of new and renewable energy 
by encouraging solar generator installations in schools and private residences, as well as enabled 
a more active participation by the local governments by granting a larger degree of autonomy 
over usage of government-owned properties for new and renewable energy initiatives.  
Public opinion polls during the Moon administration showed a general consensus towards 
expanding energy generation through new and renewable sources. A 2017 poll conducted by 
Hyundai Research Institute found that 77.8% of the respondents favored the Moon 
administration’s energy transition from nuclear and coal to new and renewable sources (Chang 
and Lee, 2017). A 2018 poll jointly carried out by the National Assembly Member Kim Sung-
whan (Democratic Party) and the Korea Photovoltaic Industry Association (KOPIA) also showed 
that 67.9% of respondents favored an increase in solar energy production (The Korea Society for 
New and Renewable Energy, 2018). Furthermore, polls conducted by Gallup found that public 
support for the government’s energy transition -- despite a consistent trend in decrease -- stayed 
high throughout the Moon administration, with over 60% of the respondents favoring Moon’s 
energy transition policy in 2018, 2019, and 2020 surveys (Gallup, 2020).  
However, the same poll by Gallup also showed that the number of respondents favoring a 
decrease in nuclear energy generation declined as well, from 32% in 2018 to 24% in 2020. 
Annual polls carried out by the Korea Nuclear Society (KNS) in 2018 and 2019 also showed that 
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the public favored a continuation of nuclear energy generation and even an increase in nuclear 
energy generation (Korea Nuclear Society, 2019). 
Findings 
Policy Formation 
 Throughout the Lee and Moon presidencies, policy formation regarding new and 
renewable energy followed a similar mechanism. Government reports on basic energy planning – 
such as “3rd Basic Plan on New and Renewable Energy Development, Use and Diffusion” – 
were formed based on the input of presidential advisory committees and reports produced by 
research institutions such as the Samsung Economic Research Institute or Korea Development 
Institute. Such basic energy planning reports outlined each president’s agenda on the energy 
sector including new and renewable energy, and the agenda was carried out by large-scale 
initiatives such as the Green Growth project during the Lee Myung-bak administration and 
Energy 3020 plan during the Moon administration. Legislative developments – mainly regarding 
the Act on the Promotion of the Development, Use and Diffusion of New and Renewable Energy 
and the Electric Utility Act – were introduced by the appropriate National Assembly Committees 
and government agencies and augmented by executive orders prior to implementation. See 
Figure 2 for a visual representation of the typical new and renewable energy-related 








Overview of New and Renewable Energy Policy Formulation and Implementation 
 
 
Business Interest and Compensation 
Advisory committees and public statements were found to be the main entry point for 
private interest into the legislature and the overall policymaking process. While informal entry 
points were not identified, it can be argued that long-standing relationships between the private 
actors and the state may allow for additional mechanisms of business interest representation in 
the policymaking process, as Finnegan (2019) argues. Furthermore, as Martin (2021) notes, 
employers in countries with pluralist model of interest representation – such as South Korea – 
tend to have less policy-making power compared to countries with macro-corporatist system of 
representation. Such system of business interest may account for the lack of formal entry point 
for business players such as chaebols.  
On the other hand, I argue that the compensation for chaebols and large business as a 
result of new and renewable policymaking can be minimized due to portfolio effect; major firms, 
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especially the chaebol firms, were found to be involved in all major areas of energy generation 
(nuclear, coal, LNG, new and renewable, etc.) through power plants construction and production 
of related equipment. For example, President Moon’s plan of reduced energy generation through 
nuclear power plants and heavier reliance on new and renewable energy resulted in increased 
demand for LNG power production, which major business players were involved in through 
LNG plants construction as well as ownership of LNG plants. Therefore, a shift in capital and 
investment based on government policy could minimize the losses and open up new sectors for 
profit.  
Furthermore, large-scale infrastructural projects during the Lee and Moon administrations 
served as a compensation for large business players for their loss incurred through the transition 
into new and renewable energy. Coal and Nuclear energy industry saw a decline each during the 
Lee and Moon administrations, however the major infrastructural projects opened up new 
opportunities for the chaebol firms due to their large capacity for taking on large-scale projects. 
Green Growth strategy and the Four-river Restoration Project as part of the strategy were carried 
out by major construction firms including Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo, GS, SK, and POSCO, 
and the Green New Deal under President Moon emphasizes hydro-powered electric cars which 
Hyundai Motor Group has a vested interest in.  
 Starting with the Lee administration, a market-driven new and renewable energy sector 
was promoted with small and medium energy producers as the main driver. Introduction of the 
RPS system opened up additional market entry points for the smaller energy producers through 
sales of RECs; however, as the report by Lee and Kang (2019) found, drop in the REC prices and 
increased competition for REC contracts with major power generators resulted in losses for the 
small to medium sized energy generators. The losses, in turn, were compensated by the 
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reintroduction of a revised FIT system under Moon administration which ensured stable source 
of revenue for small generators through 20-year fixed price contracts with KEPCO-subsidiary 
generators. Furthermore, legislative development on the Electric Utility Act in 2021 is expected 
to allow for an increased market participation for the small and medium sized generators by 
allowing direct energy sale to buyers.  
The State’s Approach to New and Renewable Energy Development 
 The above findings of this study show an overarching support for the path dependency 
hypothesis. While variations between the two administrations could be found that partly aligned 
with the ideological preference hypothesis, heavy involvement in the energy sector by the state 
spearheaded by the executive branch showed a clear trend of state intervention. The surprisingly 
small degree of differentiation between the two administrations despite their clear ideological 
differences supported Kim and Thurbon (2015)’s concept of developmental environmentalism 
which argued that the South Korean state sees the new and renewable energy sector as an area of 
state-led development.  
The persisting theme in the new and renewable energy sector throughout the Lee and 
Moon administrations could be summarized as: providing regulatory framework (RPS) and 
incentives (REC & revised FIT) for the industry players for a more market-based approach, 
simultaneously augmenting the transition towards new and renewable energy through large-scale 
infrastructure projects (Green Growth & Green New Deal) with chaebol involvement. 
Concurrent with the consistent effort for new and renewable market liberalization, the state’s 
regulatory control over the new and renewable sector persisted as the RPS system mandated 
larger players in the industry to meet new and renewable energy production standards. 
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Furthermore, the state retained control in the new and renewable energy market by MOTIE 
setting the REC weight and the RPS percentage. 
Such theme showed a continuation of the traditional role of the South Korean state as a 
developmental state with a reduced capacity; revisiting the definition of developmental state, 
strong institutions spearheading industrial development and the state’s power to intervene in the 
market are seen as some of the defining characteristics of the developmental state (Johnson 1982; 
Doner, Ritchie, & Slater 2005). The state-owned Korea Development Bank and MOTIE 
exercises control over KEPCO – as well as its subsidiaries – as a major shareholder, allowing for 
a more effective energy sector policy coordination. Furthermore, the presidency was consistently 
found to be a strong institutional force shaping the new and renewable energy policies, as each 
president’s new and renewable energy initiatives were directly implemented through legislature 
and were augmented by executive orders in regard to execution. Thus, I argue that South Korea’s 
developmental past led to the present-day model of state intervention within the new and 
renewable energy sector.  
 While this study found an overall strong support for the path dependency hypothesis, 
small variations within the Lee and Moon administrations based on their ideological standpoints 
could be found as well. For example, the Lee administration made considerable progress towards 
the new and renewable energy market liberalization. Namely, the transition to the RPS system 
during the Lee administration can be seen as a first step towards promoting increased market 
participation for the business actors in the new and renewable energy sector. Therefore, it can be 
argued that the concept of authoritarian environmentalism presented by Gilley (2012) applied to 
the Lee administration. On the other hand, the Moon administration favored a more democratic 
approach to new and renewable energy development through the Green New Deal and relevant 
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legislative updates. From the referendum regarding the shutdown of Shin-KORI 5 and 6 to 
allowing autonomy of the local governments to sell off public properties for new and renewable 
energy generation, the Moon administration has aimed for more active participation by the 
private sector and specifically the local businesses within the new and renewable energy 
industry. Furthermore, increased focus on the smaller players such as small to medium sized 
energy generators could be found during the Moon administration, exemplified by the 
introduction of revised FIT and PPA systems. Thus, characteristics of Gilley’s (2012) model of 
democratic environmentalism could be found throughout the Moon administration’s new and 
renewable energy policies. 
Conclusion 
Throughout the Lee and Moon administrations, it could be found that the state employed 
a number of mechanisms to outline and implement their new and renewable energy policy goals 
as well as devised a number of measures to compensate the industry players as appropriate. The 
study found that during the two administrations, the state played a central role in the 
development of the new and renewable sector regardless of the administrations’ ideological 
leanings. Not only that the state was central in creating a market for the new and renewable 
energy sector through the introduction of the RPS system, but the executive branch also further 
demonstrated its capacity to compensate the private sector players through the reintroduction of 
FIT system and large-scale infrastructure projects.  
The aforementioned mechanism of state involvement showed strong support for the path 
dependency hypothesis, which is supported by preexisting literature regarding the contemporary 
role of the South Korean state especially within the new and renewable energy sector. Chung and 
Kim (2018) noted that energy policy in South Korea has traditionally been a largely 
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undemocratic process; despite Moon’s effort towards democratization of the new and renewable 
energy sector, policymaking was largely carried out by the executive branch with the president 
playing a central role in national energy agenda setting. Such a trend can be interpreted as a 
continuation of South Korea’s developmental legacy, consistent with the findings of scholars 
arguing for path dependency playing a role in the continuation of state involvement (Wong 2004, 
p. 23; Han 2015).  
This study identified the overarching theme of state involvement throughout the Lee and 
Moon administrations, as well as analyzed the distinct focus areas of each administration. 
Furthermore, actors affected by policy changes and government initiatives were identified and 
the mechanism of compensation for each actor were studied. However, the study had limitations 
prohibiting a more thorough analysis of the politics regarding the new and renewable energy 
market; for example, there was a lack of consistent data published regarding the public opinion 
on the government’s new and renewable energy policy, especially during the Lee Myung-bak 
presidency. Additionally, although the study was able to identify the general framework of 
compensation for the private actors in the new and renewable energy market, limited access 
available to financial data as well as the complicated ownership structure of major chaebol firms 
made the exact calculation of losses and gains by private actors difficult.  
By providing a general overview of the new and renewable energy policymaking in 
South Korea, this study suggests possibilities for future research in the following areas: first, a 
study on the South Korean National Assembly as an informal access point for business interests 
may provide a deeper understanding of the policymaking process regarding the new and 
renewable energy policies and the business interest representation in such process. Second, a 
study of the correlation between public opinion on energy transition and the policymakers’ 
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decision-making process will provide a more comprehensive overview of the state’s response to 
public opinion from an electoral perspective. Finally, a comparative case study with neighboring 
nations with a comparable developmental past transitioning into new and renewable energy 
sources, such as Taiwan, will be beneficial in understanding the applicability of the South 
Korean case in other nations as well.  
 43 
References 
Act on the Promotion of Restructuring the Electric Power Industry 2000 (ROK). Retrieved from 
https://www.law.go.kr/법령/전력산업구조개편촉진에관한법률/(06282,20001223) 
Act on The Promotion of The Development of Alternative Energy 1987 (ROK). Retrieved from 
https://www.law.go.kr/법령/대체에너지개발촉진법/(03990,19871204) 
Act on The Promotion of the Development, Use and Diffusion of Alternative Energy 2002 
(ROK). Retrieved from 
https://www.law.go.kr/법령/대체에너지개발및이용·보급촉진법/(06672,20020325) 
Act on The Promotion of the Development, Use and Diffusion of Alternative Energy 2020 
(ROK). Retrieved from 
https://www.law.go.kr/법령/신에너지및재생에너지개발ㆍ이용ㆍ보급촉진법/(17169,
20200331) 
Chang, W.S., & Lee, J.H. (2017). 에너지 전환 정책에 대한 국민 인식 조사. VIP Report, 
708(0), 1-16 
Cho, S.M. (2020). Present and Future of New and Renewable Energy [Presentation]. Korea 
Energy Economics Institute.  
Chung, J.B., & Kim, E.S. (2018). Public perception of energy transition in Korea: Nuclear 
power, climate change, and party preference. Energy Policy, 116, 137–144. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.02.007 
Committee on Green Growth. (2010, October 13). 제 9차 녹색성장위원회 보고자료. 





Democratic Party. (2017). 제 19대 대통령선거 정책공약집 [Brochure].  
Dent, C. (2014). Renewable energy in East Asia: Towards a new developmentalism. London & 
New York: Routledge. 
Doner, R., Ritchie, B., & Slater, D. (2005). Systemic vulnerability and the origins of 
developmental states: Northeast and southeast Asia in comparative perspective. 
International Organization, 59(2), 327-361. 
Finnegan, J. J. (2019). Low carbon for the long term: Essays on the comparative political 
economy of climate change policy (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE). 
Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth 2010 (ROK). Retrieved from 
https://www.law.go.kr/법령/저탄소녹색성장기본법/(09931,20100113) 
Gallup. (2020). Korea Gallup Daily Opinion. Vol. 405. Retrieved from 
https://www.gallup.co.kr/dir/GallupKoreaDaily/GallupKoreaDailyOpinion_405(2020061
2).pdf 
Gilley, B. (2012). Authoritarian environmentalism and China's response to climate change. 
Environmental Politics, 21(2), 287–307. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2012.651904 




Guideline on the Maintenance and Execution of RPS 2012 (ROK), Retrieved from 
https://www.law.go.kr/행정규칙/신재생에너지공급의무화제도관리및운영지침/(201
0-244,20101230) 
Han, H.J. (2015). Authoritarian environmentalism under democracy: Korea's river restoration 
project. Environmental Politics, 24(5), 810–829. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2015.1051324 
Jang, H.J. (2009, October 13). [국정감사] "한수원 RPS 적용 면제해달라". Energy & 
Environment News. Retrieved April 20, 2021, from 
http://www.e2news.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=31816 
Jayasuriya, K. (2005). Beyond Institutional Fetishism: From the Developmental to the 
Regulatory State. New Political Economy 10 (3): 381-387. doi: 
10.108013563460500204290. 
Oh, J.. (2012). Strong State and Strong Civil Society in Contemporary South Korea. Asian 
Survey, 52(3), 528–549. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2012.52.3.528 
Johnson, C. (1982). MITI and the Japanese Economic Miracle. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press. 
Ju, M.J. (2010, June 14). 한수원 RPS부담 50% 줄어든다. Energy & Environment News. 
Retrieved April 20, 2021, from https://www.etnews.com/201006140248 
Kim, D.H. (2017, July 19). 백운규 "탈원전, 민주적 절차로 투명·공정하게 진행". Yonhap 
News. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20170719088100003.  
 46 
Kim, H.J., & Cho, G.L. (2010). Economic Impacts of Renewable Portfolio Standard on 
Domestic Industry. Environmental and Resource Economics Review, 19(4), 805-830. 
Kim, S.Y., & Thurbon, E. (2015). Developmental Environmentalism. Politics & Society, 43(2), 
213–240. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329215571287 
Kim, S.Y. (2019). Hybridized industrial ecosystems and the makings of a new developmental 
infrastructure in East Asia's green energy sector. Review of International Political 
Economy: RIPE, 26(1), 158–182. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2018.1554540 
Korea Energy Agency. (2021). 공급의무화(RPS). Retrieved April 20, 2021, from 
https://www.knrec.or.kr/business/rps_guide.aspx 
Korea Nuclear Society. (2019). The 4th Report on Public Perception on Nuclear Energy. 
Retrieved from https://www.kns.org/boards/view/press/100529 
Lee, S.H. (2011, June 2). 신재생에너지 공급의무화제도라도 제대로 해야. Solar Today. 
Retrieved April 20, 2021, from 
https://www.solartodaymag.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=546 
Lee, S.L., Lee, J.W., & Kim, G.W (2019). 에너지전환 정책에 따른 우리나라 중기 발전용 
천연가스 수요 전망 한국기후변화학회지, 10(1), 47–54. 
https://doi.org/10.15531/ksccr.2019.10.1.47 




Martin, C. J. (2021). Growth Strategies and Employers’ Coalitions: Renewing Welfare States. In 
Hassel, A., & Palier, B (Eds.), Growth and welfare in advanced capitalist economies: 
how have growth regimes evolved? (First edition.). Oxford University Press. 
Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. (2020, July 20). [정책위키] 한눈에 보는 정책 - 
한국판 뉴딜. Korean New Deal | 정책위키-한눈에 보는 정책 | 기획&특집 | 대한민국 
정책브리핑. https://www.korea.kr/special/policyCurationView.do?newsId=148874860.  
Ministry of Government Legislation. (2021). 전기사업법 일부개정법률안. 
Ministry of Knowledge Economy. (2008). 3rd Basic Plan on New and Renewable Energy 
Development, Use and Diffusion. 
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy. (2017). New and Renewable Energy 3020 
Implementation Plan. 
Ministry of Knowledge Economy. (2009). Report on New and Renewable Energy-related 
Technology Development, Use and Diffusion. 
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy. (2014). 4th Basic Plan on New and Renewable Energy 
Development, Use and Diffusion. 
Moon, W.J. (2013). 한국 대통령 권한과 행정부 의제설정 및 입법결과. Korean Political 
Science Review, 47(1), 75-101. 
North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge 
University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808678 
 48 
Park, K. (2017, June 17). [전문] 文대통령 고리 1호기 영구정지 선포식 기념사. Yonhap 
News. Retrieved April 20, 2021, from 
https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20170619071500001 
Park, Y.S. (2016). 한국의 제왕적 대통령론에 대한 비판적 시론: 제도주의적 설명 비판과 
편법적 제도운영을 통한 설명. Journal of Korean Politics, 25(2), 2-2. 
Pirie, I. (2005). The New Korean State: From Dirigisme to Neoliberalism. London: Routledge. 
Political economy of institutions and decisions). Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
Republic of Korea, Cheong Wa Dae. (2010). 4대강 사업 예산의 오해와 진실 (Vol. 76, 청와대 
정책소식). Retrieved April 20, 2021, from 
http://www.korea.kr/common/download.do?tblKey=EDN&fileId=206880 
Republic of Korea, Korea Culture and Information Service. (2017). Selected Speeches of 
President Moon-Jae-in of the Republic of Korea. Cheong Wa Dae. 
Stubbs, R. (2009). What ever happened to the East Asian Developmental State? The unfolding 
debate. The Pacific Review, 22(1), 1-22. 
The Korea Society for New and Renewable Energy. (2018). 신재생에너지에 관한 
국민인식조사.  
Thurbon, E. (2016). Developmental Mindset: Revival of financial activism in South Korea 
(Cornell studies in money). Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
United Nations Environment Programme. (2019). Emissions Gap Report 2019. UNEP, Nairobi. 
University Press. 
 49 
Wong, J. (2004). Healthy democracies : welfare politics in Taiwan and South Korea. Cornell 
University Press. 
Wong, J. (2014). South Korea’s Weakly Institutionalized Party System. In Party System 
Institutionalization in Asia (pp. 260–279). Cambridge University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107300385.011 
Wong, J. (2011). Betting on Biotech: Innovation and the Limits of Asia’s Developmental State. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Yeung, H.W. (2016). Transformation of State-Firm Relations in the 1980s and the 1990s. In 
Strategic Coupling. Cornell University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501702556.003.0002 
Yoon, B.R. (2021, February 16). '한전 발전사업 진출'에 반대 목소리 잇따라…"중립 훼손". 
Yonhap News. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20210216070500003.  
York, R. (2014). Korea's royal families: Presidential politics and the political economy of 
chaebol reform. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing. 
Yoshida, F., & Mori, A. (Eds.). (2015). Green growth and low carbon development in East Asia. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Lee, Y.I., & Lee, K.T. (2015). Economic Nationalism and Globalization in South Korea: A 
Critical Insight. Asian Perspective, 39(1), 125–151. https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2015.00  
